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A Look at the Record on Auditor Detection 
of Management Fraud 
Donald R. Ziegler 
Price Waterhouse & Co. 
Concluding that a perfect game has been pitched is a relatively simple matter. 
If the winning pitcher goes a full nine innings, during which his team has scored 
at least one run, and the first twenty-seven batters on the losing team fail to reach 
first base, we have a "perfect game." A single hit ruins a "perfect game" and 
even though the pitcher can claim 96.4% effectiveness, few people will long 
remember his performance. 
It's quite the opposite where auditors and management fraud are concerned. 
Turn in a "perfect record" and get no credit for it—that's what auditors are paid 
for, isn't it? But turn in a 96.4% performance and you've made it into the Hall of 
Fame. 
When it comes to detection of management fraud, what is a perfect record? In 
its strictest sense, it can only mean that every attempted fraud situation has been 
thwarted by the auditor. Similarly, an imperfect record is one in which an at-
tempted fraud was successfully perpetrated without detection by the auditor. 
Until such time as would-be perpetrators of fraud are required to report each 
attempt (perhaps to some governmental agency), there is no way to determine 
how perfectly or imperfectly auditors have performed. In the meantime, auditors 
will be presumed to have perfect records in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary. 
Undoubtedly, a number of management frauds have been successfully 
perpetrated without detection by auditors or others. It's only when the fraud 
comes to light that the possibility of audit failure becomes an issue. What this 
means is that some of the apparently perfect records may not be so perfect after all. 
"Failures" Widely Publicized; "Successes" Little Noted 
While alleged audit "failures" have received widespread publicity in recent 
years, little has been written about audit "successes.'' The reason is quite simple; 
unless the fraud or alleged fraud becomes a matter of public record the auditor can 
get no credit for its detection. 
Frauds or attempted frauds that have been detected by auditors during an or-
dinary examination (directed at the expression of an opinion on financial 
statements) rarely become part of the public record. This is because remedial ac-
tion is taken prior to the time the audit report is issued. 
Since their reports are directed to the integrity of the financial statements and 
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not (at least at the present time) to the integrity of management, auditors have no 
basis or requirement for publicly reporting that a fraud was perpetrated or at-
tempted. Similarly, management that has perpetrated or attempted to perpetrate 
fraud can hardly be expected to come forward and report that alert auditing 
detected it. 
Even if I thought some benefit could result from quantifying specific past per-
formances in the area of fraud detection (which I don't), there is no valid basis for 
tabulating successes and failures. 
So much for the record of auditor detection of management fraud. Let's now 
turn to the record (i.e., the known or recorded facts) on auditor detection of 
management fraud. This record consists essentially of: 
1. Information concerning auditors' responsibility for detection of 
management fraud, and 
2. Information concerning specific past fraud and alleged fraud situations. 
Differing Views on Auditors' Responsibility 
What is the auditor's responsibility for the detection of fraud? The answer to 
this question depends upon the person of whom it is asked. Ask an auditor who is 
up-to-date on professional literature, and you will be told that the responsibility for 
detection of fraud extends only to those frauds which would result in a material 
misstatement of financial statements. Ask certain judges, Congressmen or 
regulatory agency officials and the answer is likely to be that auditors are responsi-
ble for detection of all management fraud. 
The different answers can be attributed to different perceptions as to the stand-
ards against which auditors' performance should be measured. In the area of fraud 
detection, is it sufficient to simply comply with generally accepted auditing stand-
ards ( " G A A S " ) , or is a higher standard of performance to be the benchmark? 
Auditors believe that they should be held accountable for failure to detect fraud 
that materially affects a client's financial statements only if such failure results 
from an inadequate performance, measured by G A A S . Others have often taken 
the position that compliance with G A A S is not enough. 
While there is always the risk that the auditors will be held to a higher stand-
ard in a particular situation, I think it is reasonable to assume that auditors who 
can demonstrate that their work was performed in accordance with G A A S should 
have little to worry about when it comes to undetected management fraud. 
GAAS and Fraud Detection 
Having concluded that, in the area of fraud detection, all the auditor need do is 
comply with G A A S , we turn to G A A S and look for the heading "How to Detect 
Management Fraud.'' Since, unfortunately, there is no such heading, we must 
look elsewhere to see what G A A S says about fraud detection. 
A good place to commence looking is Section 4 of The Report of the Commis-
sion on Auditors' Responsibilities (commonly referred to as the Cohen Commis-
sion Report) which was issued in January 1978. This Section, entitled Clarifying 
Responsibility for the Detection of Fraud presents a reasonably concise disserta-
tion on the history of auditors' responsibility for fraud detection as perceived by 
auditors and by users of audited financial statements. 
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Contrary to popular belief, the auditing profession wants to assume as much 
responsibility for fraud detection as can reasonably be expected by users of finan-
cial statements. Toward this objective, it has taken a number of significant 
positive steps in recent years. One of them was the establishment by the A I C P A 
of the previously mentioned Commission of Auditors' Responsibilities. Among 
other things, the Commission was charged with considering whether there was a 
gap between public expectations and needs and auditor performance, and to make 
appropriate recommendations if a gap were determined to exist. The final report 
presents a number of recommendations on a standard of care for fraud detection. 
Other steps taken by the A I C P A include the issuance of several Statements on 
Auditing Standards ( "SAS's" ) which were intended to clarify auditors' respon-
sibilities in the fraud detection and related areas. 
Statements on Auditing Standards 
The first of these SAS's was SAS No. 6—Related Party Transactions (1975). 
Its purpose was to provide guidance as to procedures to be followed in identifying 
and evaluating disclosure of related party transactions. It was issued in the after-
math of a number of publicized cases concerning alleged management fraud in-
volving non-arm's-length transactions with controlled or otherwise related en-
tities. The substance of this SAS is proposed to be incorporated in a pending revi-
sion of The Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation S-X. It is of in-
terest to note that SAS No. 6 effectively established disclosure requirements that 
would more appropriately fall under generally accepted accounting principles, but 
as to which generally accepted accounting principles were silent. Today, it con-
tinues to be the only authoritative guidance as to the accounting for and ap-
propriate disclosure of related party transactions. 
In 1977, four SAS's which should be of interest to persons concerned with 
fraud detection were issued. Perhaps the most important of these is SAS No. 16— 
The Independent Auditor's Responsibility for the Detection of Errors or Irregu-
larities. It was issued to clarify existing authoritative pronouncements concerning 
its subject matter. It acknowledges that " . . . the independent auditor has the re-
sponsibility, within the inherent limitations of the auditing process, to plan his ex-
amination to search for errors or irregularities that would have a material effect on 
the financial statements, and to exercise due skill and care in the conduct of that 
examination . . . " While implicit in prior pronouncements (at least in the views of 
many, including my own), this is the first time that the professional literature 
acknowledges that the auditor has a responsibility in an ordinary examination to 
search for fraud which may have a material effect on the financial statements. It 
was not an easy acknowledgment to incorporate in the literature. What finally 
tipped the scale, I believe, was the fact that both the courts and the regulatory 
agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission were, in fact, holding 
the independent auditor to that level of responsibility. With this in mind then, the 
issuance of SAS No. 16 does not really impose a new level of responsibility, but 
only acknowledges in writing what the auditor presently perceives and has ac-
cepted his responsibilities to be. It is interesting to note, however, that SAS No. 
16, while it is the most comprehensive authoritative pronouncement on fraud, 
uses the word only once. 
SAS No. 17—Illegal Acts by Clients—provides guidance to an auditor as to 
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actions to be taken with respect to possible illegal acts that come to his attention 
during an examination of financial statements. It also provides guidance to the 
auditor as to the attention that should be given, in performing an examination, to 
the possibility that illegal acts may have occurred. It is somewhat of a companion 
to SAS No. 16 and is equally concerned with the integrity of management and 
with possible acts by management which could result in a material misstatement 
of the financial statements. 
SAS No. 19—Client Representations—established a requirement for auditors 
to obtain certain specific written representations from management as part of an 
examination of financial statements. It cautions, however, that the representations 
are not substitutes for auditing procedures which would otherwise be necessary to 
provide a basis for the expression of an opinion. Insofar as possible fraud is con-
cerned, the potential benefit of requiring written representations is that the 
requirement may be a deterrent if management knows that ultimately a represen-
tation will have to be made in writing to the effect that no fraud has been com-
mitted. The value of requiring written representations in this regard has recently 
been enhanced by legislation which makes it a criminal offense for management to 
knowingly make a materially false or misleading statement to an auditor in con-
nection with an examination of financial statements. 
SAS No. 20—Required Communication of Material Weaknesses in Internal 
Accounting Control—is, among other things, responsive to the auditor's concern 
with the possibility that material weaknesses in internal control could be con-
ducive to the perpetration of fraud. While, of itself, the communication of such 
weaknesses does not provide the auditor with any significant assistance in his cur-
rent examination of financial statements, the attention given and actions taken by 
management in respect to such communications may go a long way in the future 
toward preventing frauds that might otherwise have occurred. 
A I C P A Standing Subcommittee 
One of the recommendations of the Cohen Commission was the establishment 
of a separate Subcommittee of the AICPA, of which I am chairman. The commit-
tee has been designated The Standing Subcommittee on Methods of Perpetration 
and Detection of Fraud (hereinafter referred to as the "Fraud Subcommittee"). It 
has been given the responsibility of studying and publishing analyses of methods 
of perpetration and means by which various types of fraud have been detected and 
to study specific instances of alleged audit failures and to publish the results of 
such studies if they indicate that new or revised auditing standards are necessary. 
The steps that have been taken by the profession provide, in my view, a record 
of which we can be justly proud. This is not to say that we can be complacent. We 
can't. We must always be alert to the possibility that financial statements may be 
materially false and misleading as the result of management fraud. 
In March 1979, the Fraud Subcommittee published a list of warning signals to 
alert the profession to conditions under which increased attention should be 
directed in an examination of financial statements to the possibility that manage-
ment fraud may have been perpetrated. 
The Fraud Subcommittee is assisting in the development by the A I C P A of a 
continuing professional education program on the subject of management fraud. 
This program is expected to be made available to state societies later this year. 
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The Public Record 
Finally, the Fraud Subcommittee has been involved (during the two-plus years 
of its existence) in looking at the public record of past frauds and alleged frauds to 
determine what is available that may help auditors detect fraud in the future. 
One thing that has become quite clear to me, particularly during the past cou-
ple of years, is that readily available information (i.e., information contained in 
SEC releases, courtroom transcripts, news clippings and the like) on past frauds 
and alleged frauds is not all that helpful when it comes to trying to determine how 
we should go about developing a plan or program for detecting (or deterring) 
possible future frauds. At the risk of being criticized for oversimplification, my 
reading of what's readily available tells me: 
1. Watch out for overstated assets and understated liabilities, 
2. Be wary of related party transactions, 
3. Pay particular attention to large complex transactions, and 
4. Get to know your client, his business and his industry before you 
report on his financial statements. 
Not very enlightening, to say the least but very necessary. There is no 
substitute for healthy skepticism and alertness on the part of the auditor when it 
comes to possible material fraud situations. 
Information concerning fraud or attempted fraud cases that is readily available 
ordinarily does not go into sufficient detail to give us an insight as to the methods 
by which the frauds were perpetrated or attempted. What we need to know is 
which audit procedures or techniques were successful in detecting frauds that 
were perpetrated and which were helpful in thwarting frauds that were attempted. 
I believe that a wealth of information concerning methods of perpetration and 
detection could be obtained from sources that heretofore have either been 
unavailable, except to parties at interest, or not readily available. What is needed 
especially are in-depth analyses and understandings of the auditors' successes in 
the detection of material management fraud in examinations of financial 
statements. 
Difficulty in Obtaining Non-Public Information 
Difficulty in obtaining non-public information has stalled our efforts to provide 
auditors with much information that would help them to detect management 
fraud. On several occasions we have requested (in the C P A Letter and in presenta-
tions to numerous interested groups) information, disguised as appropriate, con-
cerning management fraud situations. T o date we have received no meaningful or 
helpful response. 
While all information supplied to us will be held in strict confidence, we are 
still looking for a way to guarantee those who provide us with non-public informa-
tion that it will not be available to law enforcement agencies, plaintiff's lawyers, 
regulatory agencies or the AICPA's Ethics Committee. Until such time as we're 
successful, it is somewhat doubtful that much non-public information will come 
into our possession. 
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Summary 
The Fraud Subcommittee has a long way to go and a lot of work to do if it is to 
accomplish its overall objective of determining whether there is a need for new or 
revised auditing standards with respect to the detection of material management 
fraud. I guess it would be fair to say that we have come about as far as possible in 
the profession in closing the loop when it comes to the auditor's responsibility for 
the detection of fraud. In the early 1900's one of the auditor's primary objectives 
was the detection of fraud; in the late 40's and early 50's, the auditor considered 
it to be a "responsibility not assumed"; in the 60's he acknowledged that he was 
responsible for the detection of fraud that would normally be uncovered by an ex-
amination performed in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards; 
and now, in the beginning of the 80's, the auditor has the responsibility to search 
for fraud which may have a material effect on the financial statements. Not quite a 
360 degree closing of the "loop' ' , but about as near to it as possible in today's en-
vironment. 
To sum up, I believe that auditors' won and loss records are not really rele-
vant; that the record of the profession's attention to the subject of management 
fraud shows that it is keenly aware of and interested in, and has been responsive 
to, the needs of users of financial statements; and, finally, that much helpful, 
needed information could be furnished to auditors if only those who possess it 
would share it with the rest of us. 
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